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Jury Trials in Japan
ROBERT M. BLOOM*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the late 1980s, I hosted a group of Japanese lawyers and
judges from the Osaka Bar Association Committee for Judicial
System Reform,1 a group interested in observing the jury system in
the United States. I took them to the Massachusetts Superior
Court2 where they could observe jury trials. From the discussions I
had with the visitors, it was clear that they were keenly interested
in the concept of citizen participation in the legal process.
Japan's commitment to democracy has flourished for sixty
years and is enshrined in the preamble of its post-World War 1i3
Constitution: "Government is a sacred trust of the people, the au-
thority for which is derived from the people, the powers of which
are exercised by the representatives of the people, and the benefits
of which are enjoyed by the people.",4 Despite this textual com-
* Professor of Law Boston College Law School. Author wishes to thank Franklin Schwar-
zer, Arielle Simon and Ben Steffans, students in the class of 2006, and Kathleen Halloran
and Hillary Massey, students in the class of 2007, at Boston College Law School. In addi-
tion he greatly appreciates the valuable insights provided by Judge Naoko Sonobe of the
Family and District Court who during 2004-2005 was a visiting scholar at Boston College
Law School. He also appreciates the thoughtful comments received by Professor Satoru
Shinomiya of Waseda University Law School, Tokyo, Japan. I also acknowledge with
gratitude the generous support provided by the R. Robert Popeo Fund at Boston College
Law School.
1. This group was headed by Professor Takashi Maruta of Kwansei Gakuin Univer-
sity School of Law.
2. The Trial Court of general jurisdiction in Massachusetts.
3. Promulgated on November 3, 1946 and went into effect on May 3, 1947. The con-
stitutional monarchy with a sovereign emperor was superseded by a constitutional democ-
racy in which sovereignty is entrusted in the people. There are three branches the legisla-
tive (Diet), executive (the cabinet and prime minister), and the Courts. The Diet chooses
the prime minister who heads the cabinet. See, e.g., Scott M. Lenhart, Hammering Down
Nails, 29 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 491, 493 (2001); Eric N. Weeks, A Widow's Might: Na-
kaya v. Japan and Japan's Current State of Religious Freedom, 1995 BYU L. REV. 691, 709
(1995) (discussing fact that Japanese Constitution was drafted by Americans).
4. NIHONKOKU KENP [KENP ] [Constitution] pmbl. (Japan).
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mitment, jury trials, a wonderful vehicle for citizen participation in
governmental operation, have not existed in Japan since 1943.'
The French political philosopher, Alexis de Tocqueville, com-
mented that the jury functions as "a political institution ... one of
the forms of the sovereignty of the people."6 The framers of the
United States Constitution envisioned jurors not only as a democ-
ratic check on the government's efficacy of the court system, but
also as a way to ensure citizen participation in governmental activ-
ity.7
Inspired largely by the United States Constitution and the
American experience with jury trials,8 Japan has sought to intro-
duce jury trials. The objectives of this reform are to ensure greater
participation by average citizens within the Japanese judicial sys-
tem and to establish a check on the power of the judiciary.9 Japan's
5. Kent Anderson & Mark Nolan, Lay Participation in the Japanese Justice System: A
Few Preliminary Thoughts Regarding the Lay Assessor System (Saiban-in Seido) from
Domestic Historical and International Psychological Perspectives, 37 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L. L. 935, 962 (2004).
6. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 2 (Knopf 1945) (1835).
7. Insight can be found in the language of Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156
(1968), which states, "The framers of the Constitution strove to create an independent ju-
diciary but insisted upon further protection against arbitrary action. Providing an accused
with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against
the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric
judge. If the defendant preferred the common-sense judgment of a jury to the more tu-
tored but perhaps less sympathetic reaction of the single judge, he was to have it. Beyond
this, the jury trial provisions in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a fundamental
decision about the exercise of official power-a reluctance to entrust plenary powers over
the life and liberty of the citizen to one judge or to a group of judges." See also United
States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005) (reiterating the importance of a right to a jury trial
for a convicted defendant). Arthur L. Burnett, Sr., Jury Reform for the 21" Century: A
Judge's Perspective, 20 CRIM. JUST. 32 (2005). ("Jury service in our federal and state judi-
cial systems is absolutely essential to ensure the proper functioning of our democracy, just
as important as our voting for elected officials.")
8. It is interesting to note that the Japanese Constitution drafted during United States
occupation has many of the same protections found in the United States Constitution, in-
cluding the right to counsel, protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, a due
process provision, and a double jeopardy clause. See RAMSEYER & NAKAZATO,
JAPANESE LAW AN ECONOMIC APPROACH (UNIV. CHICAGO PRESS 1998) at 4-5. It should
be pointed out that Japanese judges often cite American cases as persuasive authority.
Christopher A. Ford, Indigenization of Constitutionalism in Japanese Experience, 28 CASE
W. RES. J. INT'L L. 3, 41 (1996). Robert J. Grey, Jr., Justice through Juries, 91 A.B.A. J. 8
(Jan. 2005) ("There are more than 80,000 jury trials in this country every year with nearly
a million Americans empanelled to serve. More than five times that number take time out
of their busy schedules to show up to their local courthouse after receiving a summons.
Besides voting, few activities in the life of the typical American offer this kind of active
participation in our system of government.").
9. Anderson & Nolan, supra note 5, at 946.
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desire to adopt jury trials is the latest in an international trend to-
ward increasing the participation of citizens in the legal process,
particularly in criminal trials.'0 Being a juror is envisioned as a way
to involve average Japanese citizens in the operation of govern-
ment, a sentiment reflected in the language of the Justice System
Reform Council (JSRC):" "What commonly underlies these re-
forms is the will that each and every person will break out of the
consciousness of being a governed object and will become a gov-
erning subject. . . ."' De Tocqueville captured the same intent
when he commented on the American jury: "Juries invest each
citizen with a sort of magisterial office; they make all.., feel that
they have duties toward society and that they take a share in its
government." 3
Following the recommendations of the JSRC, the Japanese
Diet enacted legislation to create jury trials, and in May 2009 the
Japanese will institute jury trials for serious crimes, such as those
involving bodily injury.14 The legislation creates a mixed-jury sys-
10. Stephen C. Thaman explained the recent trend towards increased citizen participa-
tion in this way: "Lay participation in the affairs of state is the foundation of a democratic
society. Just as the participation of laypersons is unquestioned in the legislative and execu-
tive branches of government in a democratic society, in many countries it has played an
important part in the administration of justice as well. In countries making the transition
to democracy, legal reformers should therefore consider how lay participation could serve
to achieve the universal goals of criminal procedure in a democratic society, that is, the
ascertainment of the truth of the charge so as to ensure the conviction of the guilty and the
exoneration of the innocent, the respect of the human dignity of the accused and the vic-
tim in the criminal trial, the protection of society, restorative justice, the resolution of con-
flict and rehabilitation and reintegration of offenders. In doing so, such countries should
look to the experiences of other countries as well as to their own legal history and tradi-
tion in assessing the proper role for lay participation in the administration of criminal jus-
tice. Although the economic cost of introducing lay participation is a valid consideration,
legislators should be careful to not use this factor as an excuse for postponing otherwise
necessary and useful reforms." Stephen C. Thaman, Symposium on Prosecuting Transna-
tional Crimes: Cross-Cultural Insights for the Former Soviet Union, 27 SYRACUSE J. INT'L
L. & COM. 58, 59-60 (2000) (comments at a conference at the International Institute of
Higher Studies in the Criminal Sciences, "Lay Participation in the Criminal Trial in the
XXIst Century" at Siracusa, Italy, May 25-29, 1999).
11. See discussion infra section, History of Reform.
12. The Justice Sys. Reform Council, Recommendations of the Justice SYSTEM
REFORM COUNCIL: FOR A JUSTICE SYSTEM TO SUPPORT JAPAN IN THE 21' CENTURY
(2001), reprinted in 2001-2002 ST. LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 119, 127 [herein-
after JUSTICE SYSTEM].
13. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 6, at 291.
14. The law was promulgated on May 28, 2004 upon its signing by the prime minister.
Editorial, Reinstating a Jury System, JAPAN TIMES, May 29, 2004 (reporting details of the
legislation). "On May 21, 2004, the Japanese Diet passed an act creating a lay assessor sys-
tem. Passage was made possible following a compromise by the parties of the Coalition
government on January 26, 2004. The new Komeito Party had advocated the lawyers' po-
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
tern where citizens and professional judges determine criminal re-
sponsibility and then the resulting sentence." Specifically, six ordi-
nary citizens (saiban-in) and three professional judges will consti-
tute the jury.' Decisions are made by a majority of the group (five
to four) provided that at least one citizen and one professional
judge agree. 7 In cases where the defendant pleads guilty and both
parties consent with court approval, a panel consisting of four citi-
zens and one professional judge will determine the appropriate
sentence.18
This article will point out that despite the JSRC's noble mo-
tives, a mixed-jury system in Japan will not result in greater par-
ticipation by ordinary citizens in the Japanese legal system unless
additional procedural safeguards are enacted. Part II highlights
some of the differences between mixed juries and the American
jury system and then compares the proposed Japanese mixed-jury
system with European mixed-jury systems. Part III explains why
the Japanese opted for a mixed-jury system by examining possible
historical and political catalysts for the decision. Part IV explores
the psychological theory surrounding collective judgment and how
dominant individuals influence the group dynamic. Part V argues
that Japanese cultural attitudes will impede the effectiveness of a
mixed-jury system in Japan. Finally, Part VI proposes specific pro-
cedural devices to help ensure citizen participation, and accom-
plish the JSRC's stated objectives and hopefully overcome the ob-
stacles inherent in the proposed Japanese mixed-jury system.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF MIXED-JURY SYSTEMS
The concept of juries of twelve and unanimous verdicts had
sition of a large lay contingent of seven people with two professional judges, while the
Liberal Democratic Party had pursued the bureaucracy's position of only four lay repre-
sentatives and three judges. The compromise was built on a two-track approach that
would allow for smaller mixed courts when the defendant challenges the allegations."
Anderson & Nolan, supra note 5, at 992. As previously mentioned, jury trials have been
dormant in Japan since 1943. Japan did enact a jury system law in 1923, which took effect
in 1928. Lester W. Kiss, Reviving the Criminal Jury in Japan, 62 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Spring 1999, at 261, 266. However, as Kiss notes, the jury system failed in 1943
because of the fascist political climate, procedural defects in the system giving ultimate
authority to the judge, and finally the Japanese respect for authority which held judges in
great reverence. Id. at 266-270.
15. Editorial, Reinstating a Jury System, JAPAN TIMES, May 29, 2004.
16.Id.
17.Id.
18.Id.
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its roots in the Middle Ages.19 Medieval juries were fact-finders in
the true sense of the term, as they were selected based upon their
familiarity with the parties and the facts of the dispute and were
responsible for finding facts outside the realm of court proceed-
ings.2°
The right to a trial-by-jury existed in the American colonies
and was incorporated into the Constitution.21 Unlike the medieval
juries, juries in the United States did not do independent fact find-
ing but relied on what was presented in court. The jurors were
chosen for their impartiality and told to rely on the presentation of
facts as presented by the lawyers.22 Most states required juries of
23twelve and unanimous verdicts for convictions. In the 1970s, the
United States Supreme Court loosened the requirement for
unanimous verdicts and juries of twelve in criminal cases.24
Through the participation of average citizens in the governmental
process of dispute resolution, a jury was considered an important
exercise of political power25 and has long been regarded as a fun-
damental pillar of democracy.
26
Mixed juries differ from juries in the United States in a num-
ber of ways. A mixed-jury system consists of professional judges
("judges") and ordinary citizens ("lay judges" or "lay jurors") who
work together to determine culpability and sentencing.
In a mixed-jury system, the judge provides learned guidance
during jury deliberation,27 a potentially beneficial structure given
19. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 407 (1972).
20.See Douglas G. Smith, The Historical and Constitutional Contexts of Jury Reform,
25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 377,416 (1996).
21. Id. at 421-422.
22. Stephen C. Yeazell, The New Jury and the Ancient Jury Conflict, 1990 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 87, 92-93 (1990).
23. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. at 408 n.3. Although in the 17h Century, the Caroli-
nas, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania allowed for majority votes.
24. Id. at 406-413 (allowing for verdicts of 10-2); See also Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S.
78, 86 (1970) (allowing for a six person jury in criminal trials). Apodaco and Williams were
both cases originating in the state court system. The Supreme Court was interpreting the
Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution which states, "In all criminal prosecutions the
accused shall enjoy the right to speedy and public trials by an impartial jury .. " This
amendment was made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 3(a) requires a
unanimous verdict and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(b) requires a 12-person
jury unless otherwise stipulated. A verdict from eleven jurors is acceptable provided there
was a finding of just cause.
25. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. at 410.
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Markus Dirk Dubber, The German Jury and the Metaphysical Volk: From
2006]
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the common lack of comprehension by jurors of the judge's in-. • ~28 .. .
structions on the law in the United States. With this judicial guid-
ance, rules of evidence, which are largely designed because of a
distrust of the lay juror's ability to appropriately evaluate evi-
dence, are no longer necessary. 9 Another positive aspect of a
mixed-jury system is the more active role of jurors, who may have
an opportunity to ask questions during the trial process.3 ° Addi-
tionally, jurors in mixed-jury systems often serve for multiple years
and hear numerous cases.3 In this way, with a greater experiential
base, they might be able to act with more confidence with a profes-
sional judge and thereby more readily express their opinions.3'
Unlike the United States, where unanimous verdicts are generally
required for conviction of a crime, a majority vote usually deter-
mines culpability in a mixed-jury system.33 In addition, because
mixed juries decide issues of fact and law, they avoid the difficult
dilemma facing juries in the United States who are forced to sepa-
rate questions of law and fact.34 Mixed juries also participate in the
sentencing as well as the adjudication of a case.35
In the United States, the jury verdict is not subject to appeal
by the State in criminal prosecution because of double jeopardy
Romantic Idealism to Nazi Ideology, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 227, 257 (1995); Thomas Wei-
gend, Sentencing in West Germany, 42 MD. L. REV. 37, 62 (1983).
28. See generally Walter W. Steele, Jr. & Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Jury Instructions: A
Persistent Failure to Communicate, 67 N.C. L. REV. 77, 77-78 (1988) (finding levels of jury
understanding of court instructions to be extremely low).
29. See RAMSEYER & NAKAZATO, supra note 8, at 145.
30. See Douglas G. Smith, Structural and Functional Aspects of the Jury: Comparative
Analysis and Proposals for Reform, 48 ALA. L. REV. 441, 448-449 (1997). There is a
movement in the United States for greater involvement of jurors. See, e.g., The Past, Pre-
sent, and Future of Trade Secrets Law in Tennessee: A Practitioner's Guide Following the
Enactment of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 32 U. MEM. L. REV. 1, 35 (reforms in Ten-
nessee allowing for juror note-taking and questioning of witnesses); see also Nicole L.
Mott, The Jury in Practice: The Current Debate on Juror Questions: "To Ask or Not to
Ask, That is the Question," 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1099 (2003) (surveying the pluses and
minuses of jury questioning). Jury questioning has been implemented in Arizona. See, e.g.,
ARIz. R. CIV. P. 39(b)(10); ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 18.6(e); Michael Dann & George Logan, III,
Jury Reform: The Arizona Experience, 79 JUDICATURE 280, 281 (1996) (discussing the
Arizona reforms); Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation in Trials
Through Note Taking and Question Asking, 79 JUDICATURE 256, 257-258 (1996) (discuss-
ing results of a study designed to observe effects of juror questioning).
31. See Smith, supra note 30, at 462.
32. Id.
33.Id.
34. The role of juries in the United States is to make factual determinations. NANCY S.
MORDER, THE JURY PROCESS 7-8 (2005).
35. See Smith, supra note 30, at 469.
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protection.36 Appeals by the defendant are limited in most in-
stances to law, with the findings of facts by the jury given great
deference." In most mixed-jury systems, however, there can be a
de novo review of both law and fact.38 Japanese appellate courts,
for example, review law and fact, and the first appeal sometimes
looks like a continuation of the original trial.39
While all mixed-jury systems have certain basic traits in com-
mon, the countries that utilize a mixed-jury system have taken
widely varying approaches to jury size, voting requirements,
whether and how appeals are handled, how jurors are selected,
and what type of cases the jury can hear.
The legislation passed by the Japanese Diet lays out some of
the procedural requirements of a mixed-jury system. In cases in
which guilt is contested, the jury will be a panel of nine: six lay ju-
rors and three judges. 4° In cases where there is an acknowledgment
of guilt and consent by the parties, the panel shall consist of one
judge and four lay jurors.41 Jurors shall be those who are eligible to
vote. Convictions shall be by a majority vote provided that one
lay juror and one professional judge agree.43 The jurisdiction of the
mixed-jury is restricted to those cases that are punishable by death,
life imprisonment, or imprisonment for at least a year where the
crime committed by an intentional act caused the death of a vic-
tim." There is also a provision for an immediate appeal,45 in which
the court considers both the law and the facts of the jury trial.
46
Appeals can be taken by either the defense or prosecution.f7
36. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, "n]or shall any
person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
37. See Smith, supra note 30, at 551, 553.
38. Id. at 460.
39. See RAMSEYER & NAKAZATO, supra note 8, at 145.
40. Saiban'in no sanka suru keiji saiban ni kansuru h ritsu [Participation of Lay Asses-
sors in Criminal Trials Law], Law No. 63 of 2004, art. 2(2) (Japan) [hereinafter Criminal
Trials Law], translated in Kent Anderson & Emma Saint, Japan's Quasi-Jury (Saiban-in)
Law: An Annotated Translation of the Act Concerning Participation of Lay Assessors in
Criminal Trials, 6 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J 233,237 (2005).
41. Id. art. 2(3).
42. Id. art. 13.
43. Id. art. 67.
44. Id. art. 2(1). In 2003 this amounted to a total of 3089 cases. Statistic from Saiban-in
System, available at http://courtdomino2.courts.go.jp/saibanin.nsf/.
45. Criminal Trials Law art. 84.
46. Joseph J. Kodner, Re-introducing Lay Participation To Japanese Criminal Cases:
An Awkward Yet Necessary Step, 2 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 231,237 (2003).
47. Id.
2006]
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While Japan's approach to mixed juries borrows heavily from
similar systems in Europe, Japan's proposed mixed-jury system is
unique. By briefly examining how mixed juries operate in Italy,
Germany, Denmark, and France, one gets a better idea of how the
Japanese system will differ from European mixed juries.
A. Italy
The Corte d'assise, Italy's version of the mixed jury, is com-
posed of one professional judge who serves as "president of the
court," one professional judge from the Tribunale (an all profes-
sional judge court), and six lay jurors.4 To qualify for service as a
lay juror one must possess Italian citizenship, exhibit good moral
conduct, be between the ages of thirty and sixty-five, and have
completed secondary school education.49 The lay jurors preside
over the trial with the professional judges and enjoy equal judicial
authority. 0 The jurisdiction of the Corte d'assise is limited to cases
involving serious crimes, such as those that result in death or are
punishable by a prison sentence ranging from twenty-four years to
life, and crimes against the state (treason). 1 A simple majority is
required for deciding guilt or innocence and sentencing. 2 Tie votes
are interpreted as an acquittal53 and for purposes of sentencing in
the absence of a simple majority, the most lenient punishment will
prevail 4 Appeals from the Corte d'assise in Italy are heard by the
Corte d'assise d'appello, which is also made up of two professional
judges and six lay jurors.55 Because in Italy broad appellate rights
are afforded both parties, the defendant or the prosecution can
appeal issues of law and fact and either side may introduce new
evidence to the appellate tribunal. 6 The Corte di cassazione is the
highest of the appellate courts in Italy. This court is responsible
48. Ottavio Campanella, The Italian Legal Profession, 19 J. LEGAL PROF. 59, 78
(1994).
49. Stephen P. Freccero, An Introduction to The New Italian Criminal Procedure, 21
AM. J. CRIM. L. 345, 351, n.25 (1994).
50. Id. at 351.
51. Id. at 352.
52. Id. at 371.
53. Campanella, supra note 48, at 78.
54. Freccero, supra note 49, at 371.
55. Campanella, supra note 48, at 78-79.
56. See William T. Pizzi & Luca Marafioti, The New Italian Code of Criminal Proce-
dure: The Difficulties of Building an Adversarial Trial System on a Civil Law Foundation,
17 YALE J. INT'LL. 1, 9 (1992).
57. Campanella, supra note 48, at 79.
[Vol. 28:35
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for reconciling questions of law and is not concerned with ques-
tions of fact.58 Each section of the Corte di cassazione is comprised
of five professional judges.5 9
B. France
The Cour d'assises, the only court in the French criminal sys-
tem that uses a mixed jury, has jurisdiction over serious crimes,
which are those punishable by a prison term in excess of ten
years.60 The jury is made up of three professional judges and nine
lay jurors.61 An eight-to-four majority is required for all decisions
regarding culpability or punishment unfavorable to the defen-61
dant. Jurors must possess French citizenship with full privileges,
be between the ages of twenty-three and sixty-one, and be able to
read and write. Due to the perceived influence of the local gov-
ernment, lay jurors cannot be civil servants, government ministers,
parliamentarians, police or military officials.
In France, "jurors are selected at random from the electoral
role."65 Potential jurors are screened by a joint committee, from
which a final selection list is drawn up.66 Thirty days before the
Cour d'assises first sits, a panel of thirty-five jurors is selected,
from which nine are selected for any particular case by the presid-
ing judge in open court.6' No appeal, except one concerning issues
of law, is possible from the Cour d'assises.68 This is likely because
the defendant had been afforded a jury of his peers, and all deci-
sions of the Cour d'assise are automatically reviewed by a subdivi-• 69
sion of the appellate court. Issues of law may be appealed to the
Supreme Court of Appeal (Cour de Cassation).'0 The appellate ju-
risdiction of this court is limited to: (i) a decision by an irregularly
58.Id.
59. Id.
60. Ren6e Lettow Lerner, The Intersection of Two Systems: An American on Trial for
an American Murder in the French Cour d'Assises, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV., 791, 800 (2001);
Edward A. Tomlinson, Non-Adversarial Justice: The French Experience, 42 MD. L. REV.
131,142-43 (1983).
61. Lerner, supra note 60, at 800; Tomlinson, supra note 60, at 143.
62. COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 74 (John Hatchard et al. eds., 1996).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 53, 74.
68. Id. at 54.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 55.
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constituted tribunal, (ii) jurisdiction questions, (iii) decision in
breach of procedural requirements, (iv) a decision not supy orted
by written grounds, and (v) a decision not supported by law.
C. Germany
The German system has three trial or first instance courts,
two of which have mixed-jury systems. 72 The local courts, which
have jurisdiction over misdemeanors punishable by up to three
years in prison, have mixed juries comprised of one professional
judge and two lay jurors.7 3 The district courts, which have jurisdic-
tion over serious misdemeanors, capital offenses, and crimes pun-
ishable by over three years in prison, have mixed juries comprised
74of three professional judges and two lay jurors. The supreme
courts, which consist of five professional judges, have sole jurisdic-
tion over crimes against the State, including murder, and have no
lay jurors."
For the mixed juries in both the local court and the district
court, a two-thirds majority is required for any decision of guilt,
innocence or punishment.7 The appellate system in Germany is
slightly more complicated than its continental counterparts. If one
of the two parties is not satisfied with the judgment, it has two
remedies: appeal or revision.7 An appeal made against a decision
78of the local court may address issues of fact and law. Such an ap-
peal proceeds as a new trial, with the appellate court re-hearing
the evidence. 9 This appeal is discretionary, however, and the ap-
pellate court can deny it if it believes the decision of the trial court
was correct. 8° The district court presides over these "re-trial" ap-
peals,81 and such appeals are not allowed against decisions of the
supreme court or of the district court, when it serves as a court of
71. Id. at 55-56.
72. Id. at 102-103 (discussing the jurisdiction and composition of German mixed ju-
ries).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. Note that the supreme court of each state is different from the federal Supreme
Court, which is the highest court in Germany. Id. at 102.
76. Id. at 130.
77. Id. at 132.
78. Id. This is distinct from its American counterpart, which only allows for appeals on
issues of law.
79. Id. at 133. These re-trials are subject to similar procedural rules.
80. Id. This extends to appeals on matters of fact and matters of law.
81. Id. at 102-103. This appellate version of the district court is composed of three pro-
fessional judges and two lay judges and acts as a retrial.
[Vol. 28:35
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82first instance .
Unlike the appeal procedure, the revision procedure consid-
ers only matters of law and seeks to provide legal consistency
throughout the German Republic.83 All first instance decisions are
subject to appeal by revision84 and are presided over by the su-
preme courts and the federal Supreme Court.' Appeals by revi-
sion do not reconsider facts and will only occur where the original
judgment was procedurally incorrect or not supported by substan-
tive law.86 In this sense, the appeal by revision process is very simi-
lar to the appeals process in the United States. The German sys-
tem acts to ensure legal consistency throughout the country by
subjecting these decisions to revision by the highest courts in Ger-
many.
D. Denmark
For courts with jurisdiction over serious crimes, Denmark's
jury system is closest to the United States system, with twelve lay
jurors determining guilt.87 The mixed-jury aspect of the system
kicks in for purposes of sentencing..8 Denmark adopted its mixed-
jury system in 1937 as a means of expanding public participation in
89criminal trials. Lay jurors are used only in cases where the defen-
dant pleads "not guilty."9° Where the potential punishment is more
than four years, involves a political crime, or involves a question
concerning the defendant's placement in an institution, juries of
twelve lay jurors determine guilt.9' Only economic crimes are ex-
cluded from the jurisdiction of jury trials, as they are thought to be
too complicated. A two-thirds vote of eight to four is required for
conviction.93 After reaching a guilty verdict, the jury then deliber-
ates with three professional judges to determine sentencing.94 Each
82. This is likely because of the large size of the presiding bench. Id.
83. Id. at 133.
84. See id.
85. Id. These are two wholly professional entities.
86.Id.
87. Stanley Anderson, Lay Judges and Jurors in Denmark, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 839, 839
(1990).
88.Id.
89. Id. at 840.
90. Eva Smith, The Danish Jury and Mixed Court System, 2001-2002 ST. LOUIS-
WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L. J. 29,31 (2003).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 34.
94. See Anderson, supra note 87, at 844.
20061
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of the professional judges has four votes equaling the votes of the
twelve jurors.95 In the event of a tie, the defendant receives the
lesser penalty. 96 Appeals in these cases are handled by the Su-
preme Court, which can alter the length of the penalty, decide
whether the High Court made errors of law, or determine whether
there were procedural errors.97 The Court does not review the
jury's decision of guilt.
98
The Municipal Court initially hears criminal charges that
might result in more than a fine or less than four years of prison. 99
In such cases, the mixed jury consists of two lay jurors and one
professional judge who determine guilt and sentencing.'0 Any
question, including guilt, can be appealed. 1 The High Court han-
dles the appeal, with a mixed jury consisting of three lay jurors and
three professional judges. 1  While typically a case can only be ap-
pealed once, in very special circumstances the decision of the
mixed jury on the High Court can be appealed to the Supreme
Court.0 3
III. HISTORY OF REFORM IN JAPAN
Academics have highlighted several reasons for Japan's re-
newed interest in jury trials. In his article Reviving the Criminal
Jury in Japan, Lester W. Kiss discusses several of these factors, in-
cluding the aura of cynicism that surrounds the judiciary.'t ° In their
article, Kent Anderson and Mark Nolan point out that in addition
to the desire to deliver better justice and better democracy, some
Japanese view a lay assessor system as necessary to ensure interna-
tional competitiveness in the 21 century as a well as a means of
making trials shorter and more efficient.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See Smith, supra note 90, at 38.
98. Id.
99. See Anderson, supra note 87, at 848.
100. Smith, supra note 90, at 37.
101. Id. at 39.
102. Id.
103. Id. If the case is determined to present a problem of principle or special circum-
stance, it may be appealed to the Supreme Court. Permission for this must be granted by a
board consisting of three judges, a lawyer and a professor from one of the universities.
Smith, supra note 90, at 39.
104. Kiss, supra note 14, at 264-265 (observing that controversial judge-made verdicts
have led to criticism of Japan's judge-based system).
105. See Anderson & Nolan, supra note 5, at 944-944. See also infra note 156 and ac-
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One reason for the current reforms was a series of highly
controversial criminal cases in the 1980s. Between 1983 and 1989,
there were four controversial death penalty cases involving over-
turned confessions. The four wrongfully convicted defendants in
these cases spent a combined 130 years in prison before ultimately
being released.' °6 The publicity associated with these cases re-
flected especially adversely on the judiciary. Specifically, the cases
highlighted that the Japanese criminal justice system had a 99.9%
conviction rate, with judges almost always supporting the prosecu-
tion.' °7 In 1987, as a result of the judiciary's role in these four
wrongful convictions and mounting domestic pressure for reform,
Chief Justice Koichi Yaguchi of the Japanese Supreme Court initi-
ated a study examining the feasibility of the jury system in Japan108
Other reasons for the current reforms involve the selection
and assignment of judges. Judges in Japan are chosen from a com-
petitive exam after college graduation. °9 The low passage rate on
this exam suggests that judges represent a highly intelligent, well-
educated part of society.1 They seem to be an elitist, homogenous
companying text.
106. Daniel H. Foote, From Japan's Death Row to Freedom, PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J.
Winter 1992, at 11, 13 (documenting cases).
107. Yumi Wijers-Hasegawa, Jury System Needs to be Made Accessible for Citizens,
THE JAPAN TIMES, August 5, 2003 (explaining the high conviction rate might be that
prosecution only brings airtight cases). See DAVID T. JOHNSON, THE JAPANESE WAY OF
JUSTICE: PROSECUTING CRIME IN JAPAN 215-218 (2002) (finding this prosecutorial prac-
tice as well) [hereinafter THE JAPANESE WAY OF JUSTICE]. Judge Sonobe (see supra note
1) also concurs in this assessment. See also RAMSEYER & NAKAZATO, supra note 8, at
178-182 (showing a 99.9% conviction rate in 1994 and 99.7% of murder cases compared to
U.S. federal courts 85.1% in 1995 and 83.3% of murder). Ramseyer suggests that because
of the shortage of prosecutors, the government brings only very strong cases. He states,
"[o]f the 919,000 people arrested for criminal code crimes in 1995.. .prosecutors brought
charges against only 161,000 (17.5%). Even of the 1822 people arrested for murder, they
tried only 781 (42.9%)." Id. at 182 (citing HOMUSHO, HANZAI HAKUSHO [WHITE PAPER
ON CRIME] 122 (Tokyo: Okura sho 1996)). See also J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric Rasmusen,
Why is the Japanese Conviction Rate So High, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 53 (2001); See also Dun-
can v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,156 (1968) (noting, "[flear of unchecked power, so typical of
our State and Federal Governments in other respects, found expression in the criminal law
in this insistence upon community participation in the determination of guilt or innocence.
The deep commitment of the Nation to the right of jury trial in serious criminal cases as a
defense against arbitrary law enforcement qualifies for protection under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and must therefore be respected by the States.").
108. Foote, supra note 106, at 83-84.
109. One becomes a judge after taking the National Legal Examination (Shiho Shikh)
then followed by one year and six months of apprentice training. See Kiss, supra note 14,
at 265 n.45.
110. Kiss, supra note 14, at 266. Pass rate was 2.75% in 2001. Id. at 265 n.45. Exam tak-
ing is a very important part of Japanese society. Japanese describe their society as gaku-
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group with limited life experience. "1 Given their youth at the
commencement of their judgeship, they tend to be more impres-
sionable and are therefore subject to greater influence by some of
112the veteran actors in the system.
Indeed, the success of a judge's career in Japan seems linked
to his or her readiness to defer to the ruling party and thus find in
favor of the prosecution."' This deferral by judges has to do with
the institutional structure that controls the transfer of judges. As-
signments to higher level courts and specific geographical locations
are controlled by the Supreme Court through the Supreme Court
Secretariat.1 4 Judges are assigned to the Secretariat by the Su-
preme Court. The Supreme Court presumably independently
administers the entire judicial system, but the ruling Cabinet ap-
points individual Justices.'16 Even though there is no direct influ-
ence of politics, the control of transfer by the Supreme Court, a
politically appointed body, might have some subliminal influence
on judges' decisions." 7 Judges therefore have an incentive to find
reki shakai, one which an individual's future is determined by their academic record.
There are juku (exam cramming schools) because passing examinations is so important.
Twelve years of pre-college education culminates into two examinations. One is taken by
all Japanese high school seniors on the same day and the other is for specific university
admission. See RAMSEYER & NAKAZATO, supra note 8, at 6-9, 16-17.
111. Richard Lempert, Jury for Japan? 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 37, 48 (1992); See also John
0. Haley, Judicial Independence in Japan Revisited, 25 LAW IN JAPAN 1, 15-16 (1995)
(showing that most of Japan's judges completed the same law and undergraduate pro-
grams as one another and with members of the economic and political elite).
112. Judges in the United States are chosen or elected usually after an extensive legal
career. Therefore, they have greater life experience. See Anderson & Nolan, supra note 5,
at 942. ("[U]pon entry into the profession Japanese judges are better educated, come from
richer families, and are likely to have had more limited life experience than their non-
lawyer peers.")
113. See, e.g., Hiro Iwamura, Memoir of International Trade Law: Issues of Translating
WTO Safeguard Provisions into Japanese, 5 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 188, 210 (2004)
(continuity of ruling party causes judiciary to make decisions in accord with ruling party);
M. Christina Luera, No More Waiting for Revolution: Japan Should Take Positive Action
to Implement the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, 13 PAC. L.J. 611, 619 n.56 (2004) (noting that Japanese judiciary defer to LDP
politicians on sensitive issues because those who do enjoy better careers); David T. John-
son, American Law in Japanese Perspective, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 771, 781 (2003). In a
conversation with a Japanese judge, she indicated that the assumption that judges defer to
the wishes of politicians and government officials is largely a myth, and she hopes that by
exposing the system to citizens, this myth will be debunked.
114. RAMSEYER & NAKAZATO, supra note 8, at 17-18.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. See also J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Judicial Independence in a
Civil Law Regime: The Evidence from Japan, 13 J.L. ECON & ORG. 259 (1997) (studies
supporting the proposition that Japanese judges face politically biased incentives).
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guilt in order to avoid an appeal by a prosecutor.
1 18
In addition, judges are often isolated from ordinary people
because of their societal status. 9 The jury will expose the judge to
ordinary citizens who bring their own life experiences to their
work as jurors.120 The hope is that the introduction of lay jurors
into the decision-making process will make judges more accessible
to the public they serve. The American jury was similarly intended
to keep "class instincts of the judge in check.,
121
While the wrongful conviction cases and the high rate of con-
victions might have contributed to the exploration of juries in Ja-
pan, the major reason for the introduction of juries seems to be the
idea of greater citizen participation in the running of the govern-
ment.122 Indeed, as Richard Lempert notes, "[t]he fact that jurors
do bring non-legal values and understanding to their deliberations
is regarded by many as a virtue of the jury system and a way of in-
troducing an important democratic voice into the least democratic
of the three bricks of the modern liberal state government." 123
In July 1999, the Japanese Cabinet formed the Justice System
Reform Council (JSRC), a working group of thirteen prominent
lawyers, academics and business executives, and asked them to de-
sign a Japanese judicial system for the 21s" century. 24 One of the
project's major objectives was to enhance the legitimacy of the ju-
diciary.
This Council sincerely hopes that these Recommendations pro-
vide the opportunity for a new start for the Japanese justice sys-
tem, that the reforms proposed herein will steadily be put into
effect, and that the justice system at the earliest possible time
becomes one that is easy to use and meets the expectation and
118. Japan's conviction rate hovers above 99%. THE JAPANESE WAY OF JUSTICE, supra
note 107, at 41-42.
119. See Anderson & Nolan, supra note 5, at 942.
120. "Through the participation of the general public in criminal court trials, the trials
will reflect the general feelings and opinions of those who are not legal experts. As a re-
sult, this is expected to increase the understanding and trust of the general public toward
the justice system." SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE & JAPAN
FEDERATION OF BAR ASSOCIATIONS, START OF THE SAIBAN-IN SYSTEM 2005 [hereinaf-
ter START OF THE SAIBAN-IN SYSTEM].
121. Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57
MINN. L. REV. 639, 696 (1973).
122. JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 12, at 127.
123. Lempert, supra note 111, at 58.
124. The Council was chaired by Koji Sato, Professor of Law, Kyoto University. See Se-
tsuo Miyazawa, The Politics of Judicial Reform in Japan: The Rule of Law at Last? ASIAN-
PAC. L. & POL'Y J., Spring 2001, at 89,107 (2001) (discussing the make-up of the Council).
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trust of the people.125
More citizen exposure to the courts is one way to achieve this
objective. 12' Throughout its report, the JSRC uses language that
clearly indicates that Japan's objective in establishing a jury system
is to empower the citizenry. 17 In language reminiscent of de Toc-
queville, the report states:
What commonly underlies these reforms is the will that each
and every person will break out of the consciousness of being a
governed object and will become a governing subject, with
autonomy and bearing social responsibility, and that the people
will participate in building a free and fair society in mutual co-
operation and will work to restore rich creativity and vitality to
this country.128
With that objective in mind, the JSRC sought to create a
mixed-jury (saiban-in) system. The reformers suggested a mixed-
jury system in which judges and citizens deliberate together:
In order to establish a stronger popular base for the justice sys-
tem, measures shall be taken to expand participation of the
people in the justice system. As a new system for popular par-
ticipation in litigation proceedings which constitute the core of
the justice system, a new system shall be introduced for a por-
tion of criminal cases. Under this new system, the general public
can work in cooperation with judges, sharing responsibility for
and becoming involved in deciding the cases autonomously and
129meaningfully.
The hope is that citizen participation will result in greater ac-
ceptance of the justice system and that having citizens work with
judges will grant the judiciary wider public legitimacy.3 ° If lay ju-
rors participate as equals, the results of trials (over ninety-six per-
cent of which currently end in conviction) could become more bal-
anced. 13' Greater citizen participation will bring increased
legitimacy and respect to the judiciary by creating the perception
125. JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 12, at 224. This article focuses on the introduction of a
jury system but it should be pointed out that the Council also suggests other mechanisms
for public participation, including the selection of judges. See id. at 207.
126. Id. at 135.
127. Id. at 126-136.
128. Id. at 127.
129. Id. at 135.
130. Anderson & Nolan, supra note 5, at 943.
131. See id. at 942 (suggesting this potential benefit).
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that disputes are resolved openly and fairly. It should be noted
that de Tocqueville regarded jury duty as a great educational op-
portunity, "a free school" to learn about democracy and the court
system in particular.133
The JSRC's language regarding the objectives of jury trials
and citizen participation is wonderfully inspirational. However, by
adopting a mixed-jury system, the JSRC has greatly limited its
ability to achieve these objectives. Inherent in the choice of a
mixed-jury system is distrust in the average Japanese citizen's abil-
ity to effectively decide legal issues. While Japan wants to make its
judicial system more understandable to its citizens, it is not pre-
pared to entrust decisions solely to them, an approach seemingly
inconsistent with the democratic ideals that prompted the call for
reform in the first place. As the later section on Japanese culture
will demonstrate, the actual participation of citizens in this type of
mixed system will be minimal as opposed to mixed.
IV. How COLLECrIVE JUDGMENTS OCCUR
Juries are group decision-makers, so not surprisingly the
process by which they deliberate is similar to other group decision
processes.'3 A concept that pervades the scholarship on group de-
cision-making is that of the "opinion leader.' ' 135 The opinion leader
exists in the jury as the "dominant juror."' 36 The dominant juror of-
ten has a considerable effect on the deliberation process.'37 This
132. In Russia, for example, the conviction rate for all types of trials is 99%. In jury tri-
als, however, the conviction rate decreases to 85%. Fred Weir, A gift to Russian defen-
dants: juries; Acquittal rate has doubled to 0.08%, but reform aims for more, CHICAGO
SUN-TIMES, March 9, 2003, 2003 WLNR 6790749. By way of comparison, the United
States conviction rate in jury trials is approximately 17%. Fred Weir, A gift to Russian de-
fendants: juries; Acquittal rate has doubled to 0.08%, but reform aims for more, CHICAGO
SUN-TIMES, March 9, 2003, 2003 WLNR 6790749. See also Inga Markovits, Exporting Law
Reform - But Will it Travel? 37 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 95, 107 (noting acquittal trends in
Russian jury trials); Hon. John C. Coughenour, Reflections on Russia's Revival of Trial by
Jury, 26 SEATTLE UNIV. L. R. 399, 409-410 (2003).
133. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 6, at 275.
134. See Adam M. Chud & Michael L. Berman, Six-Member Juries: Does Size Really
Matter? 67 TENN. L. REV. 743, 755 (2000) (citing Kathleen M. Propp & Gary L. Kreps, A
Rose by Any Other name: The Vitality of Group Communication in Research, 45 COMM.
STUDS. 7,8 (1994)).
135. GABRIEL WEIMANN, THE INFLUENTIALS: PEOPLE WHO INFLUENCE PEOPLE
(1994).
136. See, e.g., Arthur Austin, The Jury System at Risk from Complexity, the New Media,
and Deviancy, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 51, 55-56 (1995).
137. See, e.g., Emma Cano, Speaking Out: Is Texas Inhibiting the Search for Truth by
Prohibiting Juror Questioning of Witnesses in Criminal Cases? 32 TEX. TECH L. REV.
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person often takes the lead and dictates the agenda by which the
decision is made. This person, the so-called opinion leader, 3 ' has
certain characteristics, such as perceived competence and specific
expertise. A judge undoubtedly embodies these qualities in a
manner that would allow him or her to emerge as the dominant ju-
ror during a trial. Certainly, judges have more experience and fa-
miliarity with legal proceedings and are thus likely to persuade and
lead decisions by a jury.9 Indeed, one study applying the opinion
leader analysis to the jury found that an individual juror's per-
ceived persuasiveness was inextricably linked to the juror's level of
education (and associated indicia such as income, social status, and
occupation)."
The impact that the "opinion leader" has over decision-
making is extensive. 4' To illustrate, a study conducted by Solomon
Asch asked a group of seven to nine individuals to observe a line
that was drawn on a white card. They were then asked to select
one card from three, which they thought best represented the line
drawn on the original card. 'The participants were asked to make
twelve selections.'" In the first two selections all the participants
chose correctly. 45 In the proceeding rounds, all participants but
one were told to select incorrectly in order to observe the impact
this would have on the unknowing participant (the "subject").' Of
the thirty-one subjects studied, the study found that the subjects
followed the incorrect majority thirty-three percent of the time,
compared to seven percent in the control group. 47 This effect was
1013, 1036 (2001) (citing Ellyn C. Acker, Standardized Procedures for Juror Interrogation
of Witnesses, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 557, 562 (1990), which concluded that dominant ju-
rors may easily persuade uninformed jurors).
138. WEIMANN, supra note 135, at 74.
139. See Anderson & Nolan, supra note 5, at 981 n.225 (deference is afforded judges in a
mixed jury setting.); See also R. Arce et al., Empirical Assessment of the Escabinado Jury
System, 2 PSYCHOL., CRIME & L. 175, 179, 181 (1996) (showing post-deliberation verdict
change toward the judge's verdict by lay assessors observed in mock trial deliberations
with one professional judge and five lay assessors).
140. REID HASTIE, STEVEN D. PENROD & NANCY PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY
145 (1983). The study was primarily conducted through post-trial juror questionnaire.
141. See Chud & Berman, supra note 134, at 757 (equating group decision making with
jury decision making).
142. SOLOMON E. ASCH, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 451 (1987).
143. Id. at 451-452.
144. Id. at 455.
145. Id. at 453.
146. Id. at 454.
147. Id. at 457. The control group consisted of twenty-five unknowing participants who
reported their judgments privately in writing. Id.
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enhanced if the subject perceived himself to be a member of the
group, something that a juror likely would feel about his relation-
ship with his peer jurors.48 Asch concluded, "[t]hat we have found
the tendency to conformity in our society so strong that reasonably
intelligent and well-meaning young people are willing to call white,
black, this is a matter of concern." " The results of this study be-
come even more disturbing when considering the importance of
group identity in Japanese culture. It is interesting to note that in a
Japanese study that measured the effect of different ratios of citi-
zens to judges (2 judges to 9 to 11 citizens or 3 judges to 6 citizens),
increasing or decreasing the ratio of judges did not necessarily
avoid the judicial dominance. 50
Another concept in group-decision making is the "spiral of si-
lence," which was identified by Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann in her
study about group minority opinions.15 In her attempt to rational-
ize a sudden shift in German voting behavior days before an elec-
tion, Noelle-Neumann observed that the position with the most
vocal support appeared stronger than it really was and other posi-
tions appeared weaker."' Once a position dominated the dis-
course, proponents of the other positions were drowned out.15 3 She
called this process a "spiral of silence." '154 According to the "spiral
of silence" theory, a viewpoint that receives more vocal support
can dominate and eventually extinguish competing opinions.
Applying the "spiral of silence" to jury deliberations, the dominant
juror is likely to be the most vocal or at least the most influential
participant in the deliberations and may therefore actually silence
other jurors.56
In 1970, the Supreme Court of the United States approved
the constitutionality of a six-person criminal jury,'57 and later ap-
148. Dominic Abrams, Knowing What to Think by Knowing Who You Are: Self-
Categorization and the Nature of Norm Formation, Conformity and Group Polarization, 29
BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 97, 109 (1990).
149. Solomon E. Asch, Opinions and Social Pressure, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, Nov.
1955, at 31, 34 (discussing the same study).
150. See Anderson & Nolan, supra note 5, at 976-77.
151. See ELISABETH NOELLE-NEUMANN, THE SPIRAL OF SILENCE (1993).
152. See id. at 3.
153. Id. at 5.
154. Id.
155. See id.
156. Fred L. Strodtbeck & Richard D. Mann, Sex Role Differentiation in Jury Delibera-
tions, 19 SOCIOMETRY 3 (1956).
157. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86 (1970).
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proved the constitutionality of a six-person civil jury. Prior to
these decisions a twelve-person jury was constitutionally re-
quired. 159 Immediately following the Court's rulings, scholars be-
gan to study the effect that jury size has on the dominance of a sin-
gle juror. Research suggests that because people's timidity and
insecurity are greater in larger numbers thus rendering them less
likely to speak,6 a larger jury enhances the likelihood of domina-
tion by an individual juror.
A second area of research is the extent to which jurors are al-
lowed to participate in the court proceedings. In an effort to en-
hance the understanding of jurors, especially in light of complex
litigation, some courts have allowed witness-questioning by ju-
161rors. In DeBenedetto,162 the Fourth Circuit allowed juror-
questioning in extreme circumstances yet warned of the power this
gives to the dominant juror: " . . .one or two jurors often will be
stronger than the other jurors, and will dominate the jury inquir-
ies.",16' The court feared that the dominant juror who audibly re-
layed his or her question would be able to influence fellow jurors
and thus persuade and impose premature deliberation.M The
court's fears were realized in DeBenedetto, when the dominant
foreperson asked over half of the ninety-five questions asked dur-
ing trial.65
One way to allay such fears of juror dominance associated
with audible witness questioning is to permit only written ques-
tions, reviewed and asked by the judge. The Third Circuit Court of
Appeals endorsed such an approach in 1999.166
A third area of focus that researchers have looked at is juror
note-taking. Some fear that note-taking skills correlate to an indi-
vidual's level of education, thus creating a further opportunity for
juror dominance. 167 However, a recent study showed that jurors
158. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 164 (1973).
159. See, e.g., Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 355 (1898).
160. See, e.g., Franklin J. Boster, An Information Processing Model of Jury Decision
Making, 18 COMM. RES. 524, 542 n.108 (1991).
161. See, e.g., Heuer & Penrod, supra note 30, at 257-58.
162. DeBenedetto v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 512 (4th Cir. 1985).
163. Id. at 516.
164. Id. at 516-17.
165. Id. at 517.
166. See United States v. Hernandez, 176 F.3d 719, 722-723 (3rd Cir. 1999).
167. Prentice H. Marshall, A View From the Bench: Practical Perspectives on Juries,
1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 147, 153 (1990).
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who take notes do not always dominate deliberations.' 68
Despite the seemingly unavoidable reality of the existence of
the dominant juror, accurate decisions are still likely to be
reached. One study showed that regardless of the make-up of the
jury, a twelve-person panel was able to reach the correct decision
eighty-three percent of the time, compared to a sixty-nine percent
accuracy for six-person panels. 169 A survey of studies on small-
group decision-making showed that groups, regardless of their
make-up, were more accurate decision makers than individuals, at
least concerning complex matters.7 ° Moreover, studies overwhelm-
ingly show that larger groups are more likely to render accurate
decisions.17" '
V. JAPANESE CULTURE
The importance of social status within Japanese culture was
driven home for me during a six-week teaching experience in Ja-
pan.'72 The janitor of my office building would greet me each day
with a low bow. One day, as a symbol of my respect for him, I tried
to bow lower than him during our morning encounter. I saw that
this made the janitor rather uncomfortable (which certainly was
not my objective!). I observed similar examples of this conscious-
ness of social status during dinners following my talks before vari-
ous Japanese bar associations when I, as the honored guest, was
seated next to the person of highest status.
73
Japan's unique cultural attributes present a significant chal-
lenge to establishing meaningful citizen participation in the Japa-
nese judicial system. Even in its report, the JSRC recognizes in-
herent impediments in Japanese society that inhibit meaningful
citizen participation. The people are accustomed to being gov-
168. Smith, supra note 30, at 574-75 (finding that note-takers did not dominate proceed-
ings).
169. MICHAEL J. SAKS, JURY VERDICTS: THE ROLE OF GROUP SIZE AND SOCIAL
DECISION RULE 86-87 (1977).
170. See MICHAEL J. SAKS, SMALL-GROUP DECISION MAKING AND COMPLEX
INFORMATION TASKS 2 (Federal Judicial Center, 1981). See infra note 181.
171. See Cheryl D. Block, Truth and Probability-Ironies in the Evolution of Social
Choice Theory, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 975, 977 n.3, 1033 (1998).
172. I taught Principles of American Law at Kwansei Gakuin University School of Law
in Nishinomiya.
173. See generally ROBERT C. CHRISTOPHER, THE JAPANESE MIND 146-150 (1983)
(discussing the Japanese's public displays of deference to persons considered to be of high
social status).
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erned, and view the "government as the ruler (the authority). 174
The Council's recommendations seek to transform the people
from passive to active participants in the operation of the govern-
ment. '
Japanese culture puts a high value on group relationships.
The slang expression "going along to get along" is particularly ap-
plicable to Japanese culture. A distinction exists in Japanese soci-
ety between what one says (tatemae) and what one really thinks
(honne). Not expressing oneself honestly has a great deal to do
with fitting into the group. The emphasis on fitting-in is high-
lighted in elementary school text books in Japan that state that
good relationships with others are valued more than asserting
one's own ideas.176 The concept of harmony is a cornerstone of
Japanese culture, a concept found in the first clause of an early
Japanese constitution dating back to 697 A.D: "Harmony is to be
valued, and an avoidance of wanton opposition to be honored.,
17
A Japanese proverb captures the importance of harmony: "The
nail that sticks up gets pounded down. ' .7 .
What flows from this desire to get along is a great emphasis
on group identification. Much of a Japanese individual's self-
esteem comes with his or her group identification. Thus, group
disapproval can be devastating. Some even suggest that group dis-
approval provides a powerful deterrent for crime in Japan.
1 79
In addition to fitting in, Japanese culture accords great re-
spect and deference to others based on their social status, which
includes considerations of wealth, profession, and position. 10 The
Japanese have a high level of respect for authority figures, a defi-
nite legacy of the Confucianism influence. There are three rela-
174. JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 12, at 127.
175. A further indication of citizen passivity can be found in a statement by JSRC
chairman Professor Emeritus Kofi Sato: "I think we have reached the situation where we
have to re-think how human beings should live, that is as 'autonomous individuals'. I feel
that the time has come to outgrow this society which passively depends on regulation from
above, and to rebuild and form a self-reliant base. The departure point is self-reliance
based on the autonomous individual, so we have to prepare a social structure that facili-
tates this." Anderson & Nolan, supra note 5, at 944.
176. Japanese Studies on Attitudes Towards Person with Mental Retardation, 40
MENTAL RETARDATION 245-251 (June 2002).
177. See 2 NIHONGI: CHRONICLES OF JAPAN FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO A.D. 697,
128 (W.G. Aston trans., Charles E. Tuttle Co. 1972) (1896).
178. CHRISTOPHER, supra note 173, at 53.
179. Id. at 164.
180. NORIKO KAMACHI, CULTURE AND CUSTOMS OF JAPAN 163-164 (Hanchao Lu
ed., Greenwood Press 1999).
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tionships prominent in Confucian ethic - father-son, ruler-subjects,
and husband-wife.'81 Each of these relationships emphasizes defer-
ence to the superior figure.182 In a family, usually the opinion of the
household head is the rule. Any dissenting opinions are regarded
as disloyal.
183
Similar status issues also appear in the language. In English, the
word "you" is used to describe anyone regardless of status. In
Japanese, age, gender, and status affect the form of address.
Given the emphasis that in effective group decision-making,
everyone must be of equal status, it is somewhat problematic
when the language itself calls attention to various status con-
184cerns.
Many scholars are convinced that as a result of the hierarchy
in Japanese society, the Japanese people prefer trial by "those
above the people" rather than by "their fellows," and that this
caused the Japanese to distrust juries from the very beginning.
People trust judges because they have a special sense of respon-
sibility when adjudicating cases and try to keep their moral
standards high in order to ensure impartial trials. Therefore,
citizen participation in the judicial process is ultimately not
suitable for the Japanese people because citizens would simply
prefer to have a judge decide their case rather than their fellow
citizens. Scholars disagree on exactly how much weight should
be given to the cultural aspect of the failure of the earlier jury
system in Japan, but most agree culture played some part.
It should be pointed out that Anderson and Nolan would question
the assumption that Japanese citizens would automatically defer to
the judge's opinion. They point out that the JSRC, aware of this
cultural perception, thought that with the appropriate leadership
186and education this cultural deference would change over time.
Hierarchy, harmony, and group identity are three powerful
reasons why a mixed-jury system will tend to stifle free and open
jury deliberation and lead to several questions. First, will the supe-
rior figure of the judge become the dominant juror and have an
181. Id. at 27.
182. See id.; See also Kiss, supra note 14, at 273.
183. See Chia Nakone, Japanese Society (1950), reprinted in JAPANESE CULTURE AND
BEHAVIOR: SELECTED READINGS 155 (Takia Sigyang Lebra & William P. Lebra eds.,
1978). Lempert, supra note 111, at 40.
184. See Nakone, supra note 183, at 155; Lempert, supra note 111, at 40.
185. Kiss, supra note 14, at 269-270.
186. Anderson & Nolan, supra note 5, at 987.
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undue influence on the jury panel? In any society, judges are re-
spected and have a great deal of influence. In the United States,
"jurors typically begin their jury experience by viewing the judge
with great deference. Jurors are laypersons, and look up to the
judge, who is an authority figure, robed in black, seated on high
with gavel in hand; clearly the judge is experienced and in control
of the proceedings.' 87 When we couple this with the hierarchal na-
ture of Japanese culture, we are presented with a difficult problem
especially when we consider the group-decision making data. Sec-
ondly, with the ideal of harmony ingrained in the Japanese psyche,
will dissenting opinion be voiced or even allowed by the group?
Finally, given the emphasis placed on group approval, how many
jurors will take a position and risk the wrath of the group?
M
As previously mentioned, a majority vote is all that the legis-
lation required for conviction' 9 Although some studies have indi-
cated that a majority vote and a unanimous verdict can be simi-
lar,19 the concern of the dominance of judges within the
deliberation process might be alleviated if a unanimous vote were
instituted. At a minimum, it would improve the perception of
meaningful citizen deliberation. At a maximum, it might enhance
the quality of argument during the deliberation process, as one
holdout would have to be convinced to change positions. 1 Cer-
tainly a unanimous vote or a minimum two-thirds vote would fos-
ter greater deliberation because it would be necessary to convince
jurors not agreeing with the majority position.
187. MORDER, supra note 34, at 118. See also Peter David Blanck et al., The Appear-
ance of Justice: Judges' Verbal and Non-Verbal Behavior in Criminal Jury Trials, 38 STAN.
L. REV. 89 (1985) (discussing the how non-verbal behavior of judges has an influence on
jurors).
188. An article in the Boston Globe recalled the experience of one Linda Cox as a juror.
She maintained her position despite pressure of the group: "But for nine hours over two
days, during an unusually hot July two years ago, Cox was told, and sometimes shouted at,
by her fellow jurors that she was wrong." Doris Sue Wong, A Lone Juror Holds Out, Aids
Quest for Freedom, BOSTON GLOBE, April 1, 1990.
189. Criminal Trials Law art. 67.
190. See Anderson & Nolan, supra note 5, at 980 n.221 (citing Ana M. Martin et al.,
Discussion, Content and Perception of Deliberation in Western European vs. American Ju-
ries, 9(3) PSYCHOL. CRIME & LAW 247, 249 (2003)).
191. See id. at 981 n.223 (citing C.J. NEMETH, DISSENT, DIVERSITY AND JURIES IN
SOCIAL INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL REALITY: PROMOTING INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL
CHANGE 23 (F. Butera & G. Mugny eds., 2001)); See generally C.J. Nemeth et al., Devil's
Advocate versus Authentic Dissent: Stimulating Quantity and Quality, 31(6) EUR. J. SOC.
PSYCHOL. 707,707-720 (2001)).
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VI. SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS
Notwithstanding the basic structure of the mixed-jury system,
there are a number of procedural measures that can contribute to
"meaningful and autonomous participation." Although as previ-
ously expressed, there are some cultural and systemic problems
with mixed juries, the following recommendations are made in
light of the confines of the system adopted by the Japanese Diet.
A. Principal of Orality
The term orality refers to evidence presented to the fact-
finder through the testimony of live witnesses.92 Under Japan's
current hearsay rule, written records of statements made outside
the trial instead of testimony at the trial are not admissible.1 93 Even
with a guilty plea, consent is required for the introduction of writ-
ten statements.1 94 Orality during contested trials should go a long
way to putting the prosecution and defense on equal footing so
that prosecutors will be unable to rely on written documents, and
thus, will need to produce live witness testimony in order to prove
their cases.
Orality will also impact the use of confessions. One of the rea-
sons for Japan's high conviction rate is due to confessions. Confes-
sions are allowed in a vast majority of cases and often form the ba-
sis for the conviction.'9 Since suspects may be detained for up to
twenty-three days before charging, it is not surprising that confes-
sions are obtained.9 6 Because of their importance in the system,
there is a great deal of pressure on prosecutors to secure confes-
sions. This pressure, coupled with the 23-day detention, could lead
to abusive tactics in obtaining confessions.' 9 Greater orality in the
192. See JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 12, at 163.
193. Id. at 162-163.
194. KEIJI SOSH H [KEISOH ] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] art. 320 (Japan),
translated in MINISTRY OF JUSTICE JAPAN, JAPAN STUDIES: STUDIES IN JAPANESE LAW
AND GOVERNMENT (Univ. Publ'n of Am. 1979).
195. RAMSEYER & NAKAZATO, supra note 8, at 169. "In 1992 they had confessions in
91.8% of all trials." Id. (citing ATSUSHI FUKUI, KEIJI SOSHO HO (CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE) 258 (2nd ed., Tokyo, Yuhikaku 1994)).
196. KEIJI SOSH H [KEISOH ] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] art. 203, 205, 208
(Japan), translated in MINISTRY OF JUSTICE JAPAN, JAPAN STUDIES: STUDIES IN
JAPANESE LAW AND GOVERNMENT 134-136 (Univ. Publ'n of Am. 1979).
197. It should be pointed out that there are provisions for protecting the suspect from
being compelled to incriminate himself. NIHONKOKU KENP [KENP ] [Constitution] art.
38 (Japan). Additionally, Article 198(2) of the Japanese Code of Criminal Procedure
states, "In the case of questioning... the suspect shall, in advance, be notified that he is
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system will help expose the possible abuses in obtaining confes-
sions.
Orality also allows the system to take advantage of the collec-
tive wisdom and common sense of the jury; the jury must evaluate
live witnesses to assess their verbal and non-verbal attributes. "To
ensure that saibin-in, who are laypersons, can sufficiently form de-
cisions by examining the evidence presented at trial, it is necessary
to materialize the principles of orality and directness."'1 9 Another
concern for jury comprehension is that trials are often interrupted
and continued for various periods (weekly or a month).'9 To
maximize the benefits of orality and ensure that jurors' memories
remain intact, once a trial begins it should be completed without
interruption.
The only exception to the principle of orality should occur
when the witness is unavailable (out of the jurisdiction or ill) and
there exists some indicia of truthfulness of the out-of-court state-
ment (akin to the rules of hearsay developed in American juris-
prudence). A deposition with all parties represented might provide
sufficient indicia of truthfulness to allow for such an exception. A
section of the legislation seems to minimize the importance of or-
ality as it allows for examinations of witnesses outside of the
courthouse.l ° It does allow, however, for the presence of jurors
who may then participate in the examination. This provision is
limited to witnesses who, because of health, age, occupation or
other limitations, cannot testify in court.
2°2
not required to make a statement against his will." KEIJI SOSH H [KEISOH ] [CODE OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] art. 198(2) (Japan), translated in MINISTRY OF JUSTICE JAPAN,
JAPAN STUDIES: STUDIES IN JAPANESE LAW AND GOVERNMENT 132 (Univ. Publ'n of
Am. 1979).
198. JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 12, at 217.
199. See RAMSEYER & NAKAZATO, supra note 8, at 139-140.
200. KEIJI SOSH H [KEISOH ] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] art. 158 (Japan),
translated in MINISTRY OF JUSTICE JAPAN, JAPAN STUDIES: STUDIES IN JAPANESE LAW
AND GOVERNMENT 123 (Univ. Publ'n of Am. 1979).
201. Id.
202. Japanese Code of Criminal Procedure stipulates that a court may examine a wit-
ness out of the courthouse when it (a) counsels a public prosecutor and a defendant or
his/her attorney, (b) considers the importance of the witness, his/her age, occupation,
health condition, other matters and the gravity of a case, and (c) deems such a examina-
tion is necessary KEIJI SOSH H [KEISOH ] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] art. 158
(Japan), translated in MINISTRY OF JUSTICE JAPAN, JAPAN STUDIES: STUDIES IN
JAPANESE LAW AND GOVERNMENT 123 (Univ. Publ'n of Am. 1979).
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B. Active Role for Jurors
A movement has begun in the United States to reform the
jury system so as to allow jurors to take a more active role during
the trial.23 The assumption that jurors who passively sit throughout
a trial will retain and understand the evidence is hardly consistent
with educational pedagogy. It is thought that greater juror com-
prehension will occur if steps are taken to involve jurors before the
judge's instructions at the end of the trial, so methods have been
developed to involve jurors more in the trial process.204
This greater involvement of jurors will likely result in a more
knowledgeable jury. More knowledge in a mixed system is crucial
to leveling the playing field between the judges and jurors. To this
end, the Japanese legislation allows for jurors to participate in the
questioning of all the witnesses including the defendant. There
are no provisions for note-taking in the legislation, but it is hoped
that it is allowable.
The legislation also does not indicate when deliberation is to
occur20 6 but one can assume that it will occur at the end of trial.
One suggestion is to allow jurors to also discuss the case before de-
liberation begins. Most jurisdictions in the United States frown on
pre-deliberation discussions, as they are concerned that jurors will
make up their minds before they have heard all the evidence. With
a judge present, however, pre-deliberation discussions could avoid
such a pre-determination, as the judge will carefully monitor the
discussions. These preliminary discussions help jurors retain and
process the pieces of information they are hearing and would be
especially useful during a long trial.
Additionally, jurors should receive pre-trial instructions on
203. These methods include: pre-deliberation discussions, instructions at the beginning
of trial in addition to the instructions at the conclusion of a trial, and questions by jurors
during the proceedings. Robert G. Boatright, The 21" Century: Reflections from the Can-
tigny Conference, 83 JUDICATURE 288, 294 (2000).
204. Boatright, supra note 203, at 294; Edward L. Barrett, Jr., Reinventing Juries: Ten
Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV 1169,1178-1194 (1995) (suggesting ten ways to
reform the American jury); See also Jurors: The Power of 12, THE ARIZONA SUPREME
COURT COMMITTEE ON THE MORE EFFECTIVE USE OF JURIES, 1994, available at
http://www.supreme.state.az.us/jury/execsumm.htm [hereinafter Jurors: The Power of 12]
(making several recommendations on how to improve jury procedures and increase the
role of jury during trial). A study done by the American Judicature Society in 1998 indi-
cated that thirty-nine percent of the American courts allowed for either note-taking, pre-
deliberation discussion of the case by jurors, or questioning by jurors during the proceed-
ings. Boatright, supra note 203, at 294.
205. Criminal Trials Law arts. 56-59.
206. See Criminal Trials Law art. 66.
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relevant law as well as explanations on trial rulings. Such instruc-
tions would describe the elements of the crime charged and the
procedural rules followed by the trial court. This approach would
address the power imbalance between professional judges and ju-
rors, would increase juror understanding of relevant evidence dur-
ing trial, and would help jurors remember evidence during final
deliberations. 20 7
C. Deliberations
Since jury deliberations in the United States are conducted in
great secrecy, little is known about how jurors actually deliberate.
Each jury is free to structure the deliberations as it sees fit with the
only general requirement being the selection of a foreperson. Ju-
rors in the United States report that they would often go into de-
liberations without being given guidance as to how to deliberate.
2 8
Because of previously expressed concerns about the Japanese
mixed-jury system, this article suggests a carefully structured de-
liberation process.2
1. Foreperson
The conduct of the judge(s) on the mixed jury during the de-
liberation is crucial. To start, judges must be committed to sharing
their previously exclusive power to adjudicate with lay jurors.
Judges should be trained to allow meaningful and autonomous
participation of lay jurors. Although the legislation does not reflect
these safeguards, there is at least recognition of concerns centering
on the active participation of lay jurors during the deliberation
process. One requirement notes that jurors must be given an op-
portunity to state their opinion and that the judges are required to
see that the opportunity arises.2° To this end, a layperson should
207. COUNCIL FOR COURT EXCELLENCE, JURIES FOR THE YEAR 2000 AND BEYOND:
PROPOSALS TO IMPROVE THE JURY SYSTEM IN WASHINGTON D.C. 61 (1998), available at
http://www.courtexcellence.org/juryreform/juries2O00final-report.pdf; See also Jurors:
The Power of 12, supra note 204, available at http://www.supreme.state.az.us/jury/exec-
summ.htm.
208. COUNCIL FOR COURT EXCELLENCE, supra note 207, at 65, available at
http://www.courtexcellence.org/juryreform/juries2000_final-report.pdf.
209. Although a majority verdict is all that is required, the following statement in START
OF THE SAIBAN-IN SYSTEM indicates that the deliberation process will be thorough:
"When a unanimous verdict cannot be reached after repeated deliberations, a verdict shall
be decided by majority vote. Such a majority requires the approval of at least one saiban-
in and one professional judge." START OF THE SAIBAN-IN SYSTEM, supra note 120.
210. Criminal Trials Law art. 66.
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be chosen as a foreperson (leader of the jury). The presiding judge
should select this person based upon the judge's assessment of the
person's leadership and character. This foreperson should be given
a simple instruction manual and/or video outlining his or her re-
sponsibilities. Presumably, with the layperson as chair of jury de-
liberation, the role of judge would diminish. An additional safe-
guard would require the foreperson to meet with each juror
privately and solicit her position. In this way, each juror would be
forced to express herself and not be influenced by the conformity
principles found in the society. Judges should also withhold their
opinions until each juror has expressed an opinion. It is worthy to
note that many Japanese judges, sitting in panels of three, are ac-
customed to having the younger judges express their opinion first
so as to eliminate the hesitation that less experienced judges may
have in expressing their opinion.
Before expressing their opinion, judges should act more as
evidentiary advisors to the lay jurors. During deliberation, judges
should help ensure that the evidence is given its appropriate
weight. For example, if evidence is highly prejudicial because of its
emotional appeal, the judge should suggest that it not be given un-
due weight. Because evidentiary rules can be complex and difficult
for lay persons to understand, an advantage that a mixed-jury sys-
tem has is that the elaborate evidence rules found in the United
States are not necessary. The evidentiary rules exist largely be-
cause of an inherent distrust that the jurors will misuse informa-
tion."
To ensure meaningful citizen participation and to guard
against the judge's control of the deliberation, the jury decision
should include a detailed record of the process. All of the jurors
should sign this record or any judgment rendered so that control
does not rest exclusively with the presiding judge. The JSRC rec-
ognized the need to have a transcript of jury deliberation to ensure
the trust of thepublic and the litigants, and to retain a record in
case of appeal." Stephen C. Thaman recommends the French sys-
tem in which the presiding judge summarizes the argument of the
defense and prosecution and then has a series of questions regard-
ing the facts. 13 The jury's response to these questions will then be
211. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
212. JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 12, at 217.
213. Stephen C. Thaman, Japan's New System of Mixed Courts: Some Suggestions Re-
garding Their Future Form and Procedures, 2001-2002 ST. LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSNAT'L
L.J. 89, 108-109 (2001).
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utilized in applying the law, and the answer will also be included in
the record. This approach is similar to the special-verdict ap-
proach utilized in the United States, in which jurors decide fact is-
sues on a case-by-case basis without considering issues of law.1 5
Their responses to these questions are recorded and the trial pro-
ceeds under the aegis of their answer. Moreover, as Professor
Mark Brodin points out, the special verdict is an adequate proce-
dural remedy to the problem of jurors' confusion with legal con-
cepts inherent when they are called upon to determine mixed law
and fact questions.216 In addition, a jury instruction explicitly stat-
ing that the jurors are indeed independent and are free to disagree
with the judge is imperative.
2. Educate the Public
Since service by the initial group of jurors will be a totally new
experience, it is important that the notice to jurors empathetically
considers and addresses many of the jurors' concerns. Brochures
or videos should be sent describing the importance of this civic ser-
vice as well as how it will operate. Careful marketing should be
employed so as to alleviate anxiety as well as provide positive en-
couragement and incentive to participate. Mundane issues such as
how to get to the court, the time of lunch break, and the appropri-
ate dress should all be addressed. 17
To ensure that citizens become more aware of their role as ju-
rors, a massive public education program should be initiated. This
program should include a broad assortment of approaches includ-
ing: tours of the courthouse, educational television about the role
of the jurors presented by judges and attorneys, an introductory
video or lecture by the judge to jurors on their day of service, and
publication of easy to read pamphlets and other reading material.
In addition, the idea of jury service should be introduced to
schoolchildren at an early age. To this end, teachers should be
trained and the curriculum adjusted. Hopefully, such a successful
program will help to alleviate the cultural concerns mentioned ear-
lier. 18
214. See id. (thoughtfully presenting how best to ensure actual lay participation).
215. Mark S. Brodin, Accuracy, Efficiency, and Accountability in the Litigation Process-
The Case for the Fact Verdict, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 15, 22 (1990).
216. Id. at 21.
217. COUNCIL FOR COURT EXCELLENCE, supra note 207, at 5-7, available at
http://www.courtexcellence.org/juryreform/juries2000 finalreport.pdf.
218. The state of Arizona has done a great deal of thinking about effective ways to use
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D. Selection Process
1. Jury Pool
People who are eligible to vote and have completed nine
years of compulsory education or can demonstrate equivalent
learning are eligible for jury service."19 Similar to the American
trend of one trial or one day, the legislation allows a juror to refuse
service if they have previously served within five years.2 0 There are
numerous exemptions, including government officials and anyone
associated with the court, and a catch-all discretionary exemption
applying to individuals who " .. .fear that considerable damage
will arise to an enterprise if the individual cannot personally un-
dertake important work in which the business is engaged.,
221
This catch-all exemption raises some concern. Specifically, the
catch-all exemption might result in more juries composed of jurors
with lesser social status participating equally with the judges. The
system adopted by the Diet has a provision for peremptory chal-
222lenges to jurors. In light of the prosecutor's considerable success
in the high rate of conviction, a prosecutor might be inclined to ex-
ercise peremptory challenges on jurors who are well educated and
would therefore most likely belong to a higher social status; these
223jurors are more likely to express themselves in the deliberation.
With the highly educated jurors out of the way, the result would be
mixed juries composed of jurors less likely to express themselves
and professional judges who can more easily control the delibera-
tions.
With regard to the selection process of jurors, Japan should
not make the same mistake historically made in the United States
of readily granting many exemptions to prospective jurors. Often
people with higher-ranking societal positions ask for, and receive,
exemptions from jury service. A movement to eliminate exemp-
juries. See Official State Website, http://www.supreme.state.az.us/jury/Jury/jury.htm. One
pamphlet, START OF THE SAIBIN-IN SYSTEM, which is an example of an excellent educa-
tion program, shows that the Japanese are already thinking about this issue. START OF
THE SAIBAN-IN SYSTEM, supra note 120.
219. See Criminal Trials Law arts. 13, 14.
220. Id. art. 16(iv).
221. Id. art. 16(vii)(c).
222. See id. art. 36. Up to four peremptory challenges are allocated each to the public
prosecutor and the defense attorney. Id.
223. See Steven I. Friedland, The Competency and Responsibility of Jurors in Deciding
Cases, 5 Nw. U. L. REV. 190, 194 (1990); See also Bateson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 92
(1986); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992); JEB v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
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tions took place in the early 1980's as jury service became less bur-
densome. Each juror was guaranteed that service would be limited
to one day or, if chosen, to one trial. The one-day/one-trial system
is becoming increasingly prevalent throughout the United States.224
Upon fulfilling the required term of service, most jurisdictions ex-
empt jurors from further service for at least two years.225 Jurors in
mixed Juries, on the other hand, serve for a period of several
years. Although this prolonged service aims to promote a more
confident and forceful juror, the extent of the commitment might
eliminate certain well-educated members of the Japanese society
with important positions (e.g. doctors, teachers). A jury composed
of less-experienced, more-intelligent jurors ensures greater parity
with judges during deliberation than a jury composed of more-
experienced, less-intelligent jurors.
When exemptions are utilized, it is not uncommon to have a
jury panel made up of elderly or unemployed people. The reduc-
tion and elimination of exemptions will result in a more meaning-. 227
ful cross-section of jurors. In this way, more people with respon-
sible, societal positions will be part of the jury. From the data on
collective decision-making previously discussed, it appears that
better-educated individuals would have more confidence to ex-
press their position in deliberation with a judge, who is perceived
as an individual with an elevated societal status.
2. Impartiality
The goal of any jury system is to have impartial jurors. But
what is meant by "impartial" is a crucial consideration. Mark
Twain, the American author, commented in 1871 as follows: "a
noted desperado [criminal] killed Mr. B, a good citizen, in the
most wanton and cold-blooded way... the papers were full of it,
224. Joanna Sobol, Hardship Excuses and Occupational Exemptions: The Impairment of
the Fair Cross-Section of the Community, 69 S. CAL. REV. 155, 219-220 (1995-1996). In
February 2005, the American Bar Association House of Delegates adopted Principle
10(c)(1), which would eliminate exemptions and automatic excuses for jury service. See
A.B.A., PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY TRIALS 51 (2005),
http://www.abanet.org/juryprojectstandards/principles.pdf.
225. Sobol, supra note 224, at 172.
226. In Germany, for example, jurors in mixed juries are selected to serve four-year
terms. John H. Langbein, Mixed Court and Jury Court: Could the Continental Alternative
fill the American Need? 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 195, 206 (1981).
227. See A.B.A., supra note 224, at 58, http://www.abanet.org/juryprojectstan-
dards/principles.pdf.
[Vol. 28:35
Jury Trials in Japan
and all men capable of reading read about it.'228 The odd lot of
"fools and rascals," who neither read nor talked about the case,
was sworn in as the jury. Twain commented, "The system rigidly
excludes honest men and men of brains.,
229
When a case is highly publicized, jury selection works to
lower the educational level of jurors. For example, people who
read a daily newspaper or watch or listen to the news will be elimi-
nated because they follow the events too closely. In order to en-
sure that a jury is composed of informed citizens, the impartial
standard should be defined more flexibly. As opposed to focusing
on knowledge about a particular case, the focus should instead be
on juror open-mindedness and willingness to consider only the
evidence presented at the trial. In this way, the jury will not ex-
clude "men of brains." Impartiality is mentioned in the legislation,
but it remains to be seen how it will be interpreted.23 °
VII. CONCLUSION
Despite the substantial concerns regarding the configuration
of the juries in Japan, there is no doubt that group solutions are
usually better than individual solutions and larger group solutions
are ordinarily better than smaller group solutions.23 1 Groups will
tend to remember more than an individual, and individual preju-
dice can be neutralized in a group setting. The Supreme Court of
the United States considered the issue of a five-person jury in
232 233Ballew v Georgia. After reviewing the research data the court
concluded that larger groups ensured more effective group delib-
eration.2 Another study found the greater the size of the jury, the
more likely it would be accurate.2 35 Although these studies do not
228. MARK TWAIN, ROUGHING IT 256 (Signet Classic, New American Library, 1872).
229. Id.
230. See Criminal Trials Law arts. 18, 34.
231. Lempert, supra note 111, at 50 (cited in HASTIE, PENROD & PENNINGTON, supra
note 140).
232. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1979).
233. See id., at 232 n.10.
234. Two researchers summarized the findings of thirty-one studies in which the size of
groups from two to twenty members was an important variable. They concluded that there
were no conditions under which smaller groups were superior in the quality of group per-
formance and group productivity. Edwin J. Thomas & Clinton F. Fink, Effects of Group
Size, 60 PSYCH. BULL. 371, 373 (1963) (cited in Richard Lempert, Uncovering "Nondis-
cernible" Differences: Empirical Research and the Jury-Size Cases, 73 MICH. L. REV. 643,
685 (1975)); See also SAKS, supra note 169, at 107.
235. Another doubt about smaller juries arises from the increasing inconsistency that
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reflect the status differences among the jurors as would exist in the
mixed-jury system in Japan, their conclusions on group behavior
are nevertheless generally applicable to Japanese groups.
The Japanese commitment to introducing a mixed-jury sys-
tem is an important first step to increasing citizen participation in
the judicial process. Hopefully, as juries become more inculcated
into Japanese society, there will be an expansion of jury decision-
making. Over time the Japanese jury might even progress from the
mixed-jury system currently espoused by the JSRC to the Ameri-
can model of exclusively citizen juries. The JSRC has indicated
great flexibility in introducing its new jury system, and has indi-
cated a willingness to constantly monitor and modify it to ensure
that it is promoting a "popular base. 2 36 Without incorporating the
measures recommended in this article however, Japan's mixed-
jury system will face serious difficulties in achieving its goals.
results as the size decreases. According to Michael J. Saks, "[t]he more a jury type fosters
consistency, the greater will be the proportion of juries which select the correct (i.e., the
same) verdict and the fewer 'errors' will be made." From his mock trials held before un-
dergraduates and former jurors, he computed the percentage of "correct" decisions ren-
dered by 12-person and 6-person panels. In the student experiment, 12-person groups
reached correct verdicts 83% of the time; 6-person panels reached correct verdicts 69% of
the time. The results for the former-juror study were 71% for the 12-person groups and
57% for the 6-person groups. SAKS, supra note 169, at 86-87 (working with statistics de-
scribed in Harry Kalven & Hans Zeisel, THE AMERICAN JURY 460 (Univ. of Chicago
Press, 1966)).
236. JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 12, at 213; See also Thaman, supra note 10, at 5
(pointing out that in Germany for less serious crimes there is a mixed panel of one judge
and two citizens).
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